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Impulsivity has been defined as choosing the smaller more immediate reward over a larger
more delayed reward. The purpose of this research was to gain a deeper understanding
of the mental processes involved in the decision making. We examined participants’
rates of delay discounting and probability discounting to determine their correlation with
time-probability trade-offs. To establish the time-probability trade-off rate, participants
adjusted a risky, immediate payoff to a delayed, certain payoff. In effect, this yielded
a probability equivalent of waiting time. We found a strong, positive correlation between
delay discount rates and the time-probability trade-offs. This means that impulsive people
have a compulsion for immediate gratification, independent of whether the immediate
reward is certain or uncertain. Thus, they seem not to be concerned with risk but rather
with time.
Keywords: impulsivity, delay discounting, probability discounting, time-probability trade-off, magnitude effect, sign
effect
Introduction
Perhaps the two most fundamental principles in financial decision making are the time value of
money and the trade-off between risk and return. It is not so surprising, then, that in the laboratory,
numerous experiments have attempted to measure how people make the trade-offs between reward
now and reward later and trade-offs between reward that will definitely be received and reward
that might or might not happen (for a review see: Green and Myerson, 2004, 2010; McKerchar and
Renda, 2012). Real life decisions, however, are not so simple, usually involving both temporal and
probabilistic elements. That is, reward might be received at a variety of points in time with varying
degrees of certainty for each. How these more complex decisions are made, then, is of considerable
practical interest.
When offered a choice between two payoffs, people usually prefer a larger payoff to a smaller
one, an earlier payoff to a later one, and a certain payoff to an uncertain one. In combination, those
who prefer a smaller, earlier payoff to a larger, later one are said to be more impulsive (Logue, 1988);
those who prefer a smaller, certain payoff to a larger, uncertain one are said to be more risk averse
(Shead and Hodgins, 2009). Delay discounting is the decrease in the subjective present value of an
outcome according to the hyperbolic function (Mazur, 1987, 1988): The greater the impulsivity, the
higher the discount rate. Probability discounting is the decrease in the subjective value of an outcome
as a function of its likelihood: The greater the risk aversion, the higher the discount rate. Discount
rates are related to the amount of the outcome. Green et al. (1997) found a magnitude effect for
temporal discounting; the discount rate decreased as the amount of the delayed payoff increased.
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Green et al. (1999) found a reverse-magnitude effect for prob-
ability discounting; the discount rate increased as the uncertain
payoff increased. Discount rates are also related to the sign of
the outcome, being smaller for losses than for gains for both
temporal discounting (Baker et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2001) and
probability discounting (Estle et al., 2006; Mitchell and Wilson,
2010). The sign effect for delay discounting means that peo-
ple express a tendency to take gains quickly but to postpone
losses. The sign effect for probability discounting means a greater
risk aversion for gains than for losses, that is, a tendency to
lock in gains but to let potential losses ride, hoping they will
not occur.
Is impulsivity independent of individual’s risk aversion, that
is, is it purely a consequence of her desire for immediate grat-
ification? Or is impulsivity at least somewhat correlating with
risk aversion. Thus far, empirical tests have not been conclusive,
with researchers finding no correlation or weakly positive correla-
tion between impulsivity and risk aversion (Myerson et al., 2003;
Ohmura et al., 2006; Shead and Hodgins, 2009).
Do people choose smaller, immediate reward because they are
just reluctant to wait, compelled to get a reward instantly (even
in a form of a lottery)? In other words: what is the nature of
impulsivity. Very little research has examined the mental trade-
off between the delay of a certain payoff and the probability of
an uncertain, immediate one. Rachlin et al. (1991) have studied
people’s delay and probability discount functions and combined
them into a time-probability trade-off function. They then showed
that the probability discount function can be derived from the
delay discount function. In this paper we approach the subject
more directly by measuring a person’s time-probability trade-
off—the risk a person is willing to assume in order to get an
immediate payoff instead of waiting for it—thereby clarifying the
foundations of impulsivity.
We examined the correlations between the time-probability
trade-off [p(t)] and delay [f (t)] and probability [f (p)] discount
rates. In short, our research hypothesis is the following: Impulsive
people choose smaller, immediate reward over larger, delayed
ones. They have a need for immediate gratification, even if the
immediate reward is uncertain. If this hypothesis is correct, there
will be a positive correlation between the delay discount rate and
the time-probability trade-off.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Two hundred and seventeen participants (91 males and 126
females), ranging in age from 19 to 23 years and enrolled in oblig-
atory lectures, were recruited for the study. They were all students
of the Warsaw University of Life Sciences. All participants signed
informed consent forms, and the procedures were approved by the
local ethics committee (Kozminski University).
Data Analysis
Of 217 individuals who participated, data for 12 were not consid-
ered due to non-systematic discounting. Discounting data were
considered systematic and used if: (a) the participant had a higher
initial indifference point (example 95% chance of obtaining PLN
200 or obtaining PLN 200 in 6 months) than the final indiffer-
ence point (a 5% probability or a 5 years delay). (This criterion
assumes delay decreases the value of a reward); (b) the partic-
ipant’s indifference points did not increase across consecutive
delays (or probabilities) by more than 20% of the larger later or
larger more probable reward. (Substantial increases in the value
of a reward across delays or probabilities suggests that the value of
a reward is enhancedwith increased delay or risk); (c) in both con-
ditions—the probability and delay discounting components of the
procedure—the data met criterion (a) and (b). These criteria are
based on the expectation of a monotonically decreasing discount-
ing function and are similar to the algorithm used by Johnson and
Bickel (2008). We did not make any assumptions regarding the
components of the time and probability trade-off, because there
has been no previous research on this topic establishing any prece-
dents. To check the magnitude effects and gain/loss asymmetry,
we conducted three two-way ANOVAs separately for p(t) (time-
probability trade-off) conditions, f (t) (delay discounting) and f (p)
(probability discounting).
Measures
As the measures of the rates of delay and probability discounting
and the measure of the time-probability trade-off, we used simple
arithmetic means computed from all indifference points in each
condition. These measures are very similar to those of the area
under the curve (AUC, Myerson et al., 2001), and we confirmed
that the simple means highly correlated with the AUC measures
(for probability: r = 0.989; p < 0.001; and for delay r = 0.993;
p < 0.001). We have used this measure to maintain consistency
for dependent variable measures across conditions. The means
are directly comparable and meaningful, that is, showing directly
how much trade-off occurs between probability and time. Indif-
ference points in probability and delay discountingwere expressed
as a ratio of the adjusted reward and uncertain/delayed reward.
For the time-probability trade-off, the dependent variable was
probability.
Procedure
There were four analogous, independent between-group condi-
tions in this study. Each participant was randomly assigned to one
of the four of them, either a gain or a loss of PLN 200 (respectively,
N = 50 andN = 55), or a gain or a loss of PLN 5000 (respectively,
N = 57 and N = 43). At the time of the study the value of these
reward was aroundUSD 70 andUSD 1700. All monetary amounts
were presented in Polish Zloty national currency (PLN).
Participants made choices between two alternatives presented
to them on their computer screens by clicking on their prefer-
ences. Each participant went through three parts of the experi-
mental procedure addressing: (1) the time-probability trade-off
p(t), (2) delay discounting f (t), and (3) probability discounting
f (p). The order of within-subject conditions was counterbalanced.
For every condition, the algorithm of the procedure was based
on the same adjusting gain or loss algorithm, adapted from the
procedure by Du et al. (2002). For the time-probability trade-off,
the probability of immediate reward was adjusted. For the delay
discounting and the probability discounting, the immediate values
or the certain values of the reward respectively were adjusted
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according to participant’s choices. So for each within-subject
condition, four indifference points were obtained.
For example, to measure p(t) in one condition, participants
were faced with a first choice of receiving PLN 200 with a 50%
chance or PLN 200 delayed by 6 months. In this condition the
amounts of reward were equal, since we wanted to measure only
the time-probability trade-off effect. In consecutive steps the odds
of winning the lottery were increased or decreased in subsequent
trials based on the participant’s previous response. If a lottery
ticket was selected, the probability of winning the lottery was
decreased, if the delayed payment was selected, the lottery odds
were increased. Themagnitude of change after the first choice was
25%, which was increased or decreased by half of the previous
magnitude in consecutive steps. Therefore, if the delayed option
was chosen, the next choicewould be betweenPLN200with a 75%
chance of receiving and PLN 200 in 6 months. The algorithm was
set to six choices per delay. In this condition therewere four delays:
6 months, 12 months, 3 years and 5 years. The loss condition
was analogous to that of the gain, the only change being in the
direction of adjustment. When the lottery was chosen, its value in
the next step increased, and when the delayed option was chosen,
the probability of the lottery decreased.
With the two other conditions, f (t) and f (p), the rules were the
same. For delay discounting, participants made choices between
smaller, immediate gains or losses and a delayed amount. The
gain (or loss) was delayed by 6 months, 12 months, 3 and 5 years.
The smaller amount was always set at the beginning to the half
of the larger payment. For probability discounting, the chances
of receiving the reward were presented in percentages and were
set to 95, 70, 30, and 5%. When the immediate (or certain) gain
was chosen, its value decreased by half, and when the delayed (or
risky) optionwas chosen, the alternative increased. As in the other
parts, the same happened in the loss condition, but the changes
were opposite, making the immediate (or certain) alternative less
attractive when it was chosen.
Results
We conducted analyses in two steps. In the first step, we analyzed
correlations among the time-probability trade-off, delay discount-
ing, and probability discounting. In the second step, we used two
factor ANOVA analysis to investigate whether factors (amount
and sign) affected the height of indifference points. All pairwise,
multiple comparisons used Sidak’s correction.
The results of the correlation analyses showed that there is a
strong relationship between f (t) and p(t), which confirms our
hypothesis. There is also a positive relationship between delay and
probability discounting for small payments, but for large payments
this relationship is not significant. The relationship between the
time-probability trade-off and probability discounting was not
significant. These results are presented in Table 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the trade-off between time and probability.
The same data is also shown on Figure 2A, but averaged across
indifference points from all condition.We performed all statistical
analyses on averaged indifference points across probabilities or
delays in order to fulfill all of the assumptions of parametric
factorial data analytic methods.
One factor was amount (PLN 200 and PLN 5000) and the
other was sign (gain or loss). In the p(t) condition there was a
TABLE 1 | Pearson’s r correlation coefficients for p(t), f(t), and f(t).
PLN 200 PLN 5000
f(t) f(p) f(t) f(p)
Gains p(t) 0.578* 0.077 0.694* 0.146
f (t) 1 0.464* 1 0.241
Losses p(t) 0.544* 0.199 0.681* 0.146
f (t) 1 0.435** 1 0.168
*p < 0.001; **p < 0.05; otherwise—non-significant.
FIGURE 1 | Median indifference points for various magnitudes (PLN
200 and PLN 5000) and signs of an outcomes (panel A: gains panel
B: losses) in the time-probability trade-off [p(t)]. The indifference
points represent an equilibrium between delay and probability: the
subjective value of a delay is expressed as probability of outcome
occurrence.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean subjective value expressed as averaged indifference
points. All data are expressed as proportions. In case of time-probability
trade-off the means can be interpreted in terms of probability, and in f (t) and f (p)
conditions as a proportion of immediate/certain subjective value to larger
later/certain reward. The panels refer to (standard deviations are presented in
order gain PLN 200, gain PLN 5000, loss PLN 200, loss PLN 5000):
(A) p(t)—probability-time trade-off (SDs respectively: 0.245, 0.205, 0.301,
0.254); (B) f (t)—delay discounting (SDs respectively: 0.236, 0.250, 0.289,
0.288); (C) f (p)—probability discounting conditions (SDs respectively: 0.181,
0.196, 0.225, 0.253).
significant main effect of amount [F(1,201) = 21.288; p < 0.001;
!2 = 0.096] and of sign [F(1,201)= 5.592; p= 0.019; !2 = 0.027].
The interaction effect was also significant [F(1,201) = 11.421;
p < 0.001; !2 = 0.054]. For interaction there were significant
differences between the two amounts for gains, but not for losses
(respectively, p< 0.001 and p= 0.395). There were also significant
differences in the means of gains and losses, but only in the PLN
200 condition (p < 0.001) and not in the PLN 5000 condition
(p = 0.481). The descriptive statistics for p(t) conditions are
presented on Figure 2A.
For delay discounting, there was a significant main effect of
sign [F(1,201) = 5.318; p = 0.022; !2 = 0.026] and of amount
[F(1,201)= 17.044; p< 0.001; !2 = 0.078]. The interaction effect
was also significant [F(1,201) = 11.303; p < 0.001; !2 = 0.053].
Delay discount rates displayed he same relations as for p(t). Only
for smaller amounts were losses discounted slower than gains
(p < 0.001). For PLN 5000 these differences were insignificant
(p= 0.464). In the gains conditions larger reward were discounted
slower than smaller ones (p < 0.001). There was no magnitude
effect in loss conditions (p = 0.597). The descriptive statistics for
f(t) conditions are presented on Figure 2B.
Probability discount rates showed significant effects for sign
[F(1,201) = 6.954; p = 0.009; !2 = 0.033] but not for amount
[F(1,201)= 3.252; p= 0.073;!2= 0.016]. Therewas no significant
interaction between the two factors [F(1,201) = 3.818; p = 0.052;
!2 = 0.019]. For probability discount rates, losses were discounted
less steeply than gains. Although neither the main effect, nor
interaction reach the statistical significance criterion, the result
can be classified as statistical tendency. The descriptive statistics
for f(p) conditions are presented on Figure 2C.
The above analyses show a magnitude effect for p(t) and f (t),
but a reverse magnitude effect was absent in f (p). There was a sign
effect for the time-probability trade-off and delay discounting,
but only for small amounts. All descriptive statistics for these
comparisons are presented in Figure 1 (standard deviations are
displayed in Figure 1 captions).
Discussion
The primary goal of the research was to examine the nature of
impulsivity. If one considers the familiar connotations of the label,
one might expect impulsive individuals to not only be unable to
postpone reward, but also to be risk takers. This would imply a
negative correlation between probability and delay discounting,
i.e., participants would choose smaller sooner reward instead of
larger delayed one and riskier, larger option instead of smaller,
but certain. However, prior research (Myerson et al., 2003; Estle
et al., 2007; Green and Myerson, 2013) has shown that the cor-
relation is slightly positive, meaning that impulsive individuals
not only choose smaller, immediate reward rather than larger,
later ones, but they are also more risk averse than individuals
who choose larger, later reward. Our results are consistent with
this. For small amounts (both gains and losses) the delay discount
rate is significantly positively correlated with the steepness of
probability discounting. This means that impulsive individuals
tend to be less risk prone, and self-controlled people tend to be
more risk prone (for small payoffs). Then, the crucial problem is
the following: do impulsive individuals choose a smaller, imme-
diate reward, regardless if the reward is certain or not, because
they are reluctant to wait, compelled to get a reward instantly?
In order to answer this question, we examined the correlation
between delay discounting and the time-probability trade-off. Our
research hypothesis was that impulsive people will choose smaller,
immediate reward over larger, delayed ones because they have a
need for immediate gratification, even if the immediate reward
is uncertain. In other words, there will be a positive correla-
tion between the delay discount rate and the time-probability
trade-off.
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The experimental design enabled us to study delay discounting
and the time-probability trade-off, taking into accounting both the
amount effect and the sign effect. For all amounts and signs, the
time-probability trade-off rate was significantly positively corre-
lated with the delay discounting rate. Therefore, when confronted
with an uncertain outcome now and a certain outcome in the
future, people tend to assess the situation as if they were simply
confronting a small amount now versus a larger amount in the
future, regardless of amounts and signs. Impulsive people pre-
fer smaller, immediate reward over larger, delayed ones because
they have a need for immediate, even uncertain, gratification. A
revealed time-probability trade-off rate shows how much risk an
individual is willing to bear in order to receive a reward immedi-
ately rather than waiting. Here, the main result of our research is a
confirmation of the research hypothesis, finding a strong positive
correlation between the delay discounting rate and the time-
probability trade-off. This means that impulsive people choose
smaller, immediate reward over larger, delayed ones because they
are motivated by a desire for instant gratification, even if that
means bearing the uncertainty of a lottery. The risk inherent in
delay may not be a factor in their decisions. People with self-
control having the ability to wait will choose larger, later reward.
Moreover, the time-probability trade-off is uncorrelated with the
probability discounting. Thismeans that the question “Howmuch
is one able to risk in order not to wait?” has nothing common
with the question “How much is one able to risk?” The classical
risk attitude describes human preferences when all options are
available in the present without the component of delay. It seems
that when one of the outcomes is immediate, an individual tends
to act not according to her risk attitude but according to her time-
probability trade-off rate. The time-probability tradeoff measures
the conversion of delay into risk, since one of the outcomes is
certain and delayed and the other is immediate and uncertain.
There are other findings which go beyond previous research.
For the time-probability trade-off, our results showed a sign
effect for small amounts (losses have larger subjective value than
gains) and an amount effect for gains (bigger payoffs have larger
subjective values than smaller ones).
There are other findings which confirm previous research.
These include: (1) The sign effect for delay discounting for small
amounts (Thaler, 1981; Estle et al., 2006) and for probability
discounting for large and small amounts taken together, which is
consistentwith the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). This means people
prefer to realize gains immediately and postpone losses (if they
happen at all) until the future. (2) Small gains were discounted
faster than large gains for the time-probability trade-off and for
delay discounting. This means that people want to realize a small
gain immediately but are willing to wait for a big score. For the
time-probability trade-off, this means that they do not want to
risk so much in case of large payoffs, which is a new result.
For probability discounting the main effect of amount was not
significant. The interaction of amount and sign of the outcomewas
not significant. Both have p values bordering significance which
might imply the statistical tendency.We can see a tendency toward
a reversed magnitude effect in the domain of losses. As noted by
Estle et al. (2006) in the domain of losses the effects of amount if
present are rather small and not always reliable.
The present researchwas done on hypothetical, not real reward.
It has been shown that the discounting process is comparable
across real and hypothetical payments (Johnson and Bickel, 2002;
Madden et al., 2003; Lawyer et al., 2011; Matusiewicz et al., 2013).
Overall, the results suggest that when one of the outcomes is
immediate, an individual tends to act not according to her risk
attitude, which matters for instant outcomes but according to
her time-probability trade-off rate. A strong positive correlation
between the time-probability trade-off and the delay discounting
rate indicates that impulsive people choose smaller, immediate
reward over larger, delayed ones because they may be mainly
motivated by a desire for instant gratification, even if that means
bearing the uncertainty of a lottery.
Author Contributions
All authors contributed to the presented work. Each of the authors
took part in drafting or revising it critically for important intel-
lectual content and approved the final version to be published.
Also all authors ensured that questions related to the accuracy
or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated
and resolved. Especially: WB, PZ: substantial contribution to the
conception and design of the work, acquisition, analysis, interpre-
tation of data for the work; MG: acquisition of the data; EMG:
interpretation of data.
Acknowledgments
This research is supported by: the Polish National Science
Centre research grant DEC-2012/04/A/HS6/00614; subsidies
from University of Social Sciences and Humanities and grant
WP/2014/B/42.
References
Baker, F., Johnson, M. W., and Bickel, W. K. (2003). Delay discounting in current
and never-before cigarette smokers: similarities and differences across com-
modity, sign, and magnitude. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 112, 382. doi: 10.1037/0021-
843X.112.3.382
Du, W., Green, L., and Myerson, J. (2002). Cross-cultural comparisons of
discounting delayed and probabilistic rewards. Psychol. Rec. 52, 479–
492.
Estle, S. J., Green, L., Myerson, J., and Holt, D. D. (2006). Differential effects of
amount on temporal and probability discounting of gains and losses.Mem.Cogn.
34, 914–928. doi: 10.3758/BF03193437
Estle, S. J., Green, L., Myerson, J., and Holt, D. D. (2007). Discounting of monetary
and directly consumable rewards. Psychol. Sci. 18, 58–63. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01849.x
Green, L., and Myerson, J. (2004). A discounting framework for choice with
delayed and probabilistic rewards. Psychol. Bull. 130, 769. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.130.5.769
Green, L., andMyerson, J. (2010). “Experimental and correlational analyses of delay
and probability discounting,” in Impulsivity: The Behavioral and Neurological
Science of Discounting, eds G. J. Madden and K. B. Warren (Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association), 67–92.
Green, L., andMyerson, J. (2013). Howmany impulsivities? A discounting perspec-
tive. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 99, 3–13.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 5155
Białaszek et al. Impulsives’ compulsion
Green, L., Myerson, J., and McFadden, E. (1997). Rate of temporal discounting
decreases with amount of reward. Mem. Cogn. 25, 715–723. doi: 10.3758/
BF03211314
Green, L., Myerson, J., and Ostaszewski, P. (1999). Amount of reward has opposite
effects on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic outcomes. J. Exp. Psychol.
Learn. Mem. Cogn. 25, 418. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.25.2.418
Johnson, M. W., and Bickel, W. K. (2002). Within-subject comparison of real
and hypothetical money rewards in delay discounting. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 77,
129–146. doi: 10.1901/jeab.2002.77-129
Johnson, M. W., and Bickel, W. K. (2008). An algorithm for identifying nonsys-
tematic delay-discounting data. Exp. Clin. Psychopharmacol. 16, 264–274. doi:
10.1037/1064-1297.16.3.264
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291. doi: 10.2307/1914185
Lawyer, S. R., Schoepflin, F., Green, R., and Jenks, C. (2011). Discounting of hypo-
thetical and potentially real outcomes in nicotine-dependent and nondependent
samples. Exp. Clin. Psychopharmacol. 19, 263. doi: 10.1037/a0024141
Logue, A. W. (1988). Research on self-control: an integrating framework. Behav.
Brain Sci. 11, 665–679. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00053978
Madden, G. J., Begotka, A. M., Raiff, B. R., and Kasten, L. L. (2003). Delay discount-
ing of real and hypothetical rewards. J. Exp. Clin. Psychopharmacol. 11, 139–145.
doi: 10.1037/1064-1297.11.2.139
Matusiewicz, A. K., Carter, A. E., Landes, R. D., and Yi, R. (2013). Statisti-
cal equivalence and test–retest reliability of delay and probability discount-
ing using real and hypothetical rewards. Behav. Process. 100, 116–122. doi:
10.1016/j.beproc.2013.07.019
Mazur, J. E. (1987). “An adjusting procedure for studying delayed reinforcement,” in
Quantitative Analyses of Behavior, Vol. 5, The Effect of Delay and of Intervening
Events on Reinforcement Value, eds M. L. Commons, J. E. Mazur, J. A. Nevin,
and H. Rachlin (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum), 55–73.
Mazur, J. E. (1988). Estimation of indifference points with an adjusting-
delay procedure. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 49, 37–47. doi: 10.1901/jeab.1988.
49-37
McKerchar, T. L., and Renda, C. R. (2012). Delay and probability discounting in
humans: an overview. Psychol. Rec. 62, 817–834.
Mitchell, S. H., and Wilson, V. B. (2010). The subjective value of delayed and
probabilistic outcomes: outcome size matters for gains but not for losses. Behav.
Process. 83, 36–40. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2009.09.003
Murphy, J. G., Vuchinich, R. E., and Simpson, C. A. (2001). Delayed reward and cost
discounting. Psychol. Rec. 51, 5.
Myerson, J., Green, L., and Warusawitharana, M. (2001). Area under the
curve as a measure of discounting. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 76, 235–243. doi:
10.1901/jeab.2001.76-235
Myerson, J., Green, L., Hanson, J. S., Holt, D. D., and Estle, S. J. (2003). Discounting
delayed and probabilistic rewards: processes and traits. J. Econ. Psychol. 24,
619–635. doi: 10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00005-9
Ohmura, Y., Takahashi, T., Kitamura, N., and Wehr, P. (2006). Three-month stabil-
ity of delay and probability discounting measures. Exp. Clin. Psychopharmacol.
14, 318. doi: 10.1037/1064-1297.14.3.318
Rachlin, H., Raineri, A., and Cross, D. (1991). Subjective probability and delay. J.
Exp. Anal. Behav. 55, 233–244. doi: 10.1901/jeab.1991.55-233
Shead, N.W., andHodgins, D. C. (2009). Probability discounting of gains and losses:
implications for risk attitudes and impulsivity. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 92, 1–16. doi:
10.1901/jeab.2009.92-1
Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Econ. Lett.
8, 201–207. doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7
Tversky, A., andKahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology
of choice. Science 211, 453–458. doi: 10.1126/science.7455683
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2015 Białaszek, Gaik, McGoun and Zielonka. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC
BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 5156
